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CHAPTER I: 
MONETARY POLICY AND REGIONAL ECmOMIC ACTIVITY 
Introduction 
It has been accepted by regional-urban economists that fiscal policy 
has a differential impact with respect to economic regions. Federal ex­
penditures are used to improve a specific region's economic position 
relative to other regions, or to slow down the rate of decline in the 
most depressed regions. Federal expenditures for the purchase of goods 
and services from the private sector and for capital improvements such as 
road and dam construction have their most immediate impact on regional 
income and employment. 
Monetary policy, on the other hand, is ignored by regional economists. 
It is tacitly assumed to have a homogenous effect on regional and urban 
economic activity. A survey of six of the most prominent textbooks used 
in teaching Regional-Urban Economics shows that only one, Wilbur Thompson's 
Preface to Urban Economics, lists monetary policy in the index.^ However, 
an inspection of the relevant pages reveals that Thompson's discussion is 
limited to fiscal policy and structural unemployment. No mention at all is 
made of monetary policy. It is possible that regional-urban economists are 
not justified in ignoring the regional effects of monetary policy. 
^he textbooks surveyed are: Werner Z. Hirsch, Urban Economic 
Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973); Hugh 0. Nourse, Regional Economics 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); J. R. Boudeville, Problems of Regional 
Economic Planning (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 1966); 
Wilbur R. Thompson, A Preface to Urban Economics (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1965); Harry W. Richardson, Elements of Regional Economics 
(Baltimore: Penguin, 1969); Edgar M. Hoover, The Location of Economic 
Activity (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948). 
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Studies conducced by economists on the differential impact of monetary 
policy on individual sectors of the economy have raised serious doubts 
as to the appropriateness of the assumption that the effects of monetary 
policy work their way evenly throughout the economy. The contention by 
these economists is that changes in the stock of money have a differential 
impact on different sectors of the business community. It is felt by some 
economists that monetary policy serves to redistribute resources to some 
industries and firms at the expense of others. This is held to be espe­
cially true during periods of tight money. Bach and Huizenga sum up this 
2 
position as follows: 
Restrictive monetary policy is widely opposed because of its 
alleged undesirably discriminatory effects. Tight money it is 
claimed, lets big borrowers go free while shutting off little 
ones. It restricts construction activity while letting invest­
ment in plant and equipment boom.... 
It runs up interest costs to those less able to pay. It penalizes 
new borrowers at the expense of old established customers. 
The arguments in favor of the proposition that monetary policy has a 
differential impact on different sectors of the economy are based on the 
fact that different firms have different market structures and hence dif­
ferent market power in the economy. Some firms are more prosperous than 
others and are in a better economic position to command resources. During 
periods of tight money the more prosperous firms, the oligopolists accord­
ing to Galbraith, are relatively better off in terms of obtaining loans 
2 
G. L. Bach and C. J. Huizenga, "The Differential Effects of Tight 
Money," American Economic Review, LI, No. 1 (March, 1962), 52. 
3 
than the relatively weaker firms. The advantaged firms are both better 
able to pay the higher interest rates resulting from tight money and are 
less "risky" and therefore more creditworthy from the banker's point of 
view. 
When money becomes scarce, a relatively greater amount of loans go 
to the most profitable firms and, as a result, the marginal borrowers are 
relatively worse off. Bach and Huizenga found that the differential im­
pact, or discrimination in their terminology, could be explained mainly 
4 in terms of differences in the credit-worthiness of borrowers. 
Tight money in 1955-57 apparently led those commercial banks which 
felt its impact to alter their asset portfolio significantly; they 
shifted to obtain funds to increase loans to profitable borrowers, 
especially business firms, even at the cost of liquidating govern­
ment securities on a declining market. Discrimination amongst 
borrowers was apparently largely on traditional banking standards 
of credit-worthiness and goodness of borrowers.... 
It has long been observed by regional economists that the more 
economically sound industries and firms, the faster growing industries, 
are found in the larger metropolitan areas and the weaker, slow growing 
or declining firms are found in the smaller towns. Regional economists 
explain this phenomenon in part by the filter-down theory of industrial 
location. Thompson explains the filter-down theory in the following 
5 
manner. 
3 
John K. Galbraith, "Market Structures and Stabilization Policy," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXIX (May, 1957), 124-133. 
^Bach and Huizenga, "The Differential Effects of Tight Money," p. 79. 
^Wilbur R. Thompson, "The Economic Base of Urban Problems," in 
Contemporary Economic Issues, ed. by Neil W. Chamberlain (Homewood, 
Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), 8. 
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In national perspective, industries filter down through the 
systems of cities, from places of greater to lesser industrial 
sophistication. Most often, the highest skills are needed in the 
difficult, early stage of mastering a new process, and skill 
requirements decline steadily as the production process is 
rationalized and routinized with experience. As the industry 
slides down the learning curve, the high wage rates become super­
fluous. The aging industry seeks out the industrial backwaters 
where the cheaper labor is now up to the lesser demands of the 
simplified process.... 
A filter-down theory of industrial location would go far toward 
explaining the isolated small towns lament that it always gets the 
slow growing industries. They find that they must run to stand 
still, as their industrial catches seem only to come to these cut 
of the way places to die. 
Although Thompson's concluding remarks may be a bit too strong, the 
point that the most economically viable and profitable firms are located 
in large urban regions is well taken. If monetary policy does have a 
differential impact on different sectors of the economy as some evidence 
suggests, it is reasonable to expect that the large urban regions in 
which the more dynamic industries are located will be affected in a 
different manner by changes in the stock of money than the regions 
composed of smaller towns and their less profitable enterprises. 
There are no a priori grounds to dismiss the possibility that 
monetary policy may have a differential impact on regions. Whether or 
not all regions are affected in the same way by changes in the stock of 
money is an empirical question which should be subjected to investigation 
and statistical analysis. 
If a regional differential impact exists, it is quite possible that 
changes in the stock of money to "fine tune" the economy can change 
regional income unequally. Decreases in the rate of growth of the 
5 
money stock would have a greater dampening effect on the smaller, slower 
growing regions. Monetary policy, coupled with the natural advantages of 
the industrial centers, would make it very difficult for the depressed 
areas to break their cycle of poverty. Monetary policy, in this case, 
could frustrate the fiscal efforts of State and Federal governments to 
upgrade the economies of the slow growing and declining regions. If the 
differential impact hypothesis is correct, there could very well exist a 
trade-off between inflation and regional income inequality. As the 
monetary authorities decrease the stock of money to curb inflation, they 
worsen the relative economic position of the disadvantaged regions. The 
extent of the trade-off would depend upon the effect that changes in the 
stock of money have on inflation at any point in time, and the extent to 
which those changes contribute to regional income inequality. 
The Role of Commercial Banks 
The monetary authorities formulate specific economic goals for the 
economy as a whole and set forces in motion that bring about changes in 
the stock of money in order to move the national economy in the desired 
direction. The authorities have three instruments they can use to bring 
about desired changes in the stock of money. They can: change the 
interest rate on member bank borrowing, change the legal reserve require­
ments of member banks, and engage in open market operations. 
By changing the interest rate that the Federal Reserve charges to 
member bank borrowers, they can either encourage or discourage borrowing 
by commercial banks for the purposes of increasing their reserves. 
Theoretically, a low interest rate on Federal Reserve borrowing relative 
6 
Co the interest rates received from commercial bank loans should encourage 
lending by commercial banks. ' Conversely, a high interest rate on Federal 
Reserve borrowing relative to the interest rates received on loans should 
discourage lending by commercial banks. In practice it is found, however, 
that commercial banks are reluctant to use the discount window as a means 
of acquiring reserves in order to increase their customer loans.^ 
If the authorities choose, they may change the legal reserve require­
ment that commercial banks have to meet and thereby increase or decrease 
the amount of reserves available for lending or other profit-making activi­
ties that the banks engage in. An increase (decrease) in the legal reserve 
requirement decreases (increases) the reserves available for loans, hence 
its contractionary (expansionary) impact on the stock of money. 
The instrument used most frequently to bring about changes in the 
stock of money is open market operations. When the Fed buys securities, 
the textbooks tell us that securities dealers increase their deposits in 
commercial banks. Concomitantly, excess reserves in commercial banks are 
increased. These excess reserves are in turn loaned to the community, 
which sets in motion the familiar chain of events related to the multiple 
expansion of deposits, and thus in economic activity. Contrariwise, there 
is a decrease in the money stock and in economic activity when the Fed 
sells securities to the public. 
Regardless of which instrument or combination of instruments the 
monetary authorities choose to use, the individual commercial banks play 
^Murray E. Polakoff, "Reluctance Elasticity, Least Cost, and Member-
Bank Borrowing; A Suggested Integration," Journal of Finance. XV (March, 
1960), 1-18; Stephen M. Goldfeld and Edward J. Kane, "The Determinants 
of Member-Bank Borrowing: An Econometric Study," Journal of Finance, XXI 
(September, 1966), 499-514. 
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a central role in the transmission of monetary policy. How commercial 
banks respond to changes in their reserves has a direct effect on the 
amount of loans and the conditions under which loans are made available to 
the public and hence on economic activity. Banks not only serve as con­
duits through which the effects of monetary policy are channeled to the 
real sector, but their behavior helps determine the magnitude of those 
effects. 
The Focus of Previous Studies of the Differential Impact of Monetary Policy 
The empirical studies on the differential impact of monetary policy 
have largely limited their attention to discovering why the larger firms 
receive a greater share of the available loans during periods of tight 
money than the smaller firms. As was previously noted, Bach and Huizenga 
attribute the differential impact to differences in "credit-worthiness" 
between the bank's bigger and smaller customers.^ Their conclusions were 
challenged by Silber and Polakoff, in part because they failed to define 
the concept of credit-worthiness in either a theoretical framework, or in 
g 
an operationally meaningful way. 
Silber and Polakoff estimate bank loan offer curves for small and 
large borrowers which are used to measure the bank's desire to discrimi­
nate. They then determine the actual discrimination, or differential 
effect of tight money, under different plausible assumptions about the 
borrower's demand curves. Unlike Bach and Huizenga, Silber and Polakoff 
^Bach and Huizenga, "Differential Impact," p. 79. 
O 
William L. Silber and Murray E. Polakoff, "The Differential Effects 
of Tight Money: An Econometric Study," Journal of Finance, XXV (March, 
1970), 83-99. 
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do not make an explicit allowance for differences in the financial condi­
tions of individual firms. As a consequence, they reject the notion that 
a differential impact can be attributed to anything other than bankers' 
unexplained desire to discriminate. 
Neither the Bach and Huizenga nor the Silber and Polakoff studies 
explicitly identify which variables bankers consider when making loans. 
Gupta recognizes this inherent weakness in the previous studies and 
develops a "loan-safety model", as he calls it, which makes explicit the 
9 
variables that bankers consider when lending to an individual firm. The 
implications of his model are that loans to the smaller firms are charac­
terized by lower safety factors than loans to larger firms. Gupta con­
tends that the bigger firms are more profitable and better able to with­
stand economic adversities. These economic advantages, coupled with the 
fact that credit costs vary inversely with the size of the loan, serves 
to squeeze out the small marginal borrowers when money becomes tighter. 
The differential impact studies of monetary policy, such as the 
works cited above, have thus far been devoid of any spatial implications. 
To the extent that the location of the banks was not explicitly con­
sidered, they cannot test the proposition that changes in the stock of 
money have a differential impact with respect to regional economic 
activity. 
If banks in different regions are all similarly affected by changes 
in monetary policy, and if they respond in a similar fashion to these 
changes, then a strong case can be made for the proposition that monetary 
9 
Manak C. Gupta, "Differential Effects of Tight Money: An Economic 
Rationale," Journal of Finance, XXVIII (September, 1970), 828-838. 
9 
policy has no differential impact on regions. More specifically, it is 
necessary to find the effect of monetary policy on the supply of loans 
of banks in different regions. 
Scope of the Study 
It is the objective of this study to develop a theoretical model 
that identifies the variables that banks consider important in making 
loan decisions. Statistical tests will then be performed on regional 
bank portfolio data in order to test the regional differential impact 
hypothesis. 
10 
CHAPTER II: 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
The theoretical model used in this study to specify the determinants 
of bank lending is derived from the model of bank behavior developed by 
1 2 3 
Dudley Luckett and the work of Carl Vander Wilt and Steve Steib. These 
studies use a microeconomic portfolio maximizing approach to analyze bank 
behavior. I have disaggregated the loan category in their model and have 
made long-run profits an explicit argument in the utility function. 
Given the bank's position at any point in time, say t-1, it is assumed 
that in order to maximize utility the banker formulates a desired level of 
lending, L*, which he would like to achieve in the following period t. If 
he is able to achieve equilibrium in one time period, L^, the actual level 
of loans at t is equal to L*, the desired level. The banker may be unable 
to reach eouilibrium, however, so that L will be less than L*. In that 
t t 
case, the actual change in lending between periods t-1 and t, L^ -
is a fraction of L* - L^_^. This relation is expressed as follows: 
\ 
alternatively: 
(2) = a* - Lj.j) 
^Dudley G. Luckett, "Credit Standards and Tight Money," Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, II (November, 1970), 420-434. 
2 
Carl Vander Wilt, "Member Bank Borrowing: A Microeconomic Approach" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State University, 1968). 
^Steve B. Steib, "The Euro-Dollar Market as a Source of United States 
Bank Liquidity" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State University, 
1972). 
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where : 
AL^ = the actual change in loans between t-1 and t 
Y = the fraction by which the banker is able to adjust to 
equilibrium in a single period. 
= the desired level of loans at t 
L , = the actual level of loans at t-1 
t-1 
t = time subscript 
is the aggregate level of loans outstanding at time t, and as such 
it is the sum of the individual loans. This relation is expressed as: 
Lit 
where ; 
= the amount of the loan outstanding of the i. th customer at t. 
In reality the banker is faced with requests for loans from borrowers 
with different characteristics, so that requests for loans are judged by 
the impact that either granting or denying the loan will have on the bank's 
position. Apart from the normal considerations of short-run profit and 
risk associated with each individual loan, loans may be evaluated by the 
effect that they will have on the bank's soundness and liquidity posi-
4 
tions and by the effect of the loan on long-run profits. 
In this study it is assumed that bankers differentiate between loan 
requests on the basis of the effect chat the loan will have on the bank's 
soundness, liquidity, short-run profits, and long-run profits. 
The concepts of "soundness", "liquidity" and "long-run profits" are 
defined and developed in the following section in the course of develop­
ing the theoretical model. 
12 
Regardless of the criteria that a banker may employ to differentiate 
among borrowers, the banker will find it cumbersome and expensive to 
gather all the information necessary to differentiate between each and 
every customer in minute detail. Jaffee and Modigliani suggest that 
bankers assign customers to different classes or categories where borrowers 
with similar but not identical characteristics will be treated in like 
fashion.^ 
In the limit the number of classes, m, can be as large as the number 
of individual customers, n, but, "to make the whole arrangement manageable 
the number of different rate classes would have to be reasonably small.^ 
We can assume that in the interest of saving time and money, the banker 
will choose a number of classes, m, such that m will be much smaller than 
the number of customers n. 
If the banker chooses to classify his customers into m categories 
equation (3) can be written as : 
m 
where : 
L.^ = the amount of loans outstanding for the j.th category at time t. 
* 
In making a decision about the desired level of loans , the banker 
is assumed to decide about the desired level of loans for each of the m 
* 
classes, . The desired level of loans can be written as: 
' j!, St 
^Dwight M. Jaffee and Franco Modigliani, "A Theory and Test of Credit 
Rationing," American Economic Review, LIX (December, 1969), 850-872. 
^Ibid., p. 860. 
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Substituting equations (4) and (5) into equation (2) yields: 
( 6 )  
m m m ^ m 
^ " j-1 
Since the banker makes a decision about the desired level of loans for 
each class, equation (7) holds. 
^jt ' Ljt-1 " ^j(^jt " ^ jt-1^ 
for j = 1,..., m 
where : 
Yj = the fraction by which the banker is able to adjust to equili­
brium in a single period. 
Changes in the level of loans are a function of the desired level of 
loans. In order to specify the variables that determine the desired level 
of loans, it is necessary to develop a model of individual bank behavior, 
A Model of Bank Behavior 
A simplified balance sheet identity can be written in the following 
manner : 
(8) R + L + G = DD + TD + CD + F + FR + UB 
where : 
R, G, L, DD, TD, CD, B i 0; UB, F I 0 
and 
R = reserves 
G = government securities 
L = loans 
DD = demand deposits 
TD = time and savings deposits 
14 
CD = certificates of deposit 
FR = borrowings from the Federal Reserve 
UB = Euro-dollar borrowings 
F = federal funds 
Banks can increase their reserves, and hence their ability to make 
loans, by incurring liabilities. In addition to accepting demand deposits, 
time deposits and certificate of deposits, banks can borrow money from the 
Federal Reserve, the federal funds market, and in the case of the largest 
banks, the Euro-dollar market. In the interest of keeping the following 
analysis of bank behavior within reasonable limits, the specific "borrow­
ings" variables, UB, FR, and F, will be treated as one variable, B. The 
main issue here is bank loans and not the banks' specific liabilities. 
Treating the borrowings variables separately adds nothing essential to 
this study and serves only to unnecessarily complicate the theoretical 
model. The balance sheet identity then can be written as: 
(9) R + L + G = DD + TD + CD + B 
where : 
(10) B = F + FR + UB 
Assuming that b^rJcs hold no excess reserves, reserves can be expressed 
as : 
(11) R = rDD + s(TD + CD) 
where : 
r = the reserve requirement ratio on demand deposits 
s = the reserve requirement on time and savings deposits 
Substituting equation (11) into (9) and simplifying yields: 
(12) G + L = (l-r)DD + (1-s)(TD + CD) + B 
15 
The banker is assumed to manage his portfolio in such a manner as to 
maximize his utility. His utility function is of the form: 
(13) U = U (TT, S , A, TT^) 
where : 
TT = short-run profits 
S = soundness 
A = liquidity 
TT^ = long-run profits 
Short-run Profits 
Short-run profits are defined as the difference between total 
revenue and total costs : 
(14) TT = TR - TC 
where : 
TR = total revenue 
TC = total costs 
Total revenue is given by the following expression: 
(15) TR = gG + pL + Ô DD 
where : 
g = the interest rate on government securities 
p = an average interest rate on loans 
5^ = the service charge rate on demand deposits 
Total cost is given by: 
(16) TC = vTD + bB + cCD + GgDD + FC 
where : 
16 
V = the rate of interest paid on time and savings deposit 
b = the rate of interest paid on borrowings 
c = the rate of interest paid on certificates of deposit 
6^ = the cost of servicing demand deposits 
FC = fixed costs including the cost of servicing loans 
Substituting (15) and (16) into (14) yields: 
(17) TT = gG + pL + 6^DD - vTD - cCD - bB - ggDD " FC 
Assuming that the service charge on demand deposits is equal to the cost 
of servicing demand deposits, equation (17) can be written as: 
(18) TT = gG + pL - vTD - cCD - bB - FC 
Under the assumption that bankers differentiate between loans to 
different customers, the banker is not constrained to charge a uniform 
rate of interest. The total revenue received from loans, pL, is the sum 
of the revenue received from each individual loan. This relation is 
expressed as: 
n 
(19) pL = S p L 
i=l 
where : 
p^ = the rate of interest charged to the _i th customer 
Substituting (19) into (18) yields: 
n 
(20) TT = gG + E p.L. - vTD - cCD - bB - FC 
i=l ^ ^  
The aggregate revenue received from loans, pL, also can be expressed as 
the sum of the revenues received from each loan class: 
m 
(21) pL = Z p.L. 
j=l ^ J 
where : 
17 
p .  = the rate of interest charged to customers in the jth class 
L. = the level of loans of the jth class 
Substituting (21) into (18) yields the following short-run profit 
The concept of soundness refers to the bank's ability to survive 
severe unforeseen contractions of a local or national character. Sound­
ness is a measure of the bank's ability to meet its obligations to its 
customers in the event of forced liquidation due to an unexpected 
economic contraction. 
The measure of soundness used in this study derives from the 
Federal Reserve's Form for Analyzing Bank Capital. Soundness is defined 
as a weighted difference between the realizable value of the bank's 
assets during periods of contraction and an assumed maximum decline in 
liabilities during that period. The banker, who quite naturally is con­
cerned with the survival of the firm during periods of distress, is 
assumed to assign weights to each class of assets and liabilities. In 
this fashion he determines the bank's soundness position at any point in 
time. Soundness is given by: 
function: 
m 
(22)  T 7  = gG + Z p.L. - vTD - cCD - bB - FC 
2=1 ^ ^ 
Soundness 
(23) 
where : 
S^ = the measure of soundness at time t 
18 
= the percentage of the current value of the bank's present 
holdings of government securities which would be available 
under assumed conditions of distress 
= the percentage of the current value of the bank's present hold­
ings of loans which would be available unde* assumed conditions 
of distress 
= the percentage by which the bank's current certificate of 
deposit liabilities might decline under assumed conditions of 
distress 
= the percentage by which the bank's current time and savings 
deposits might decline under assumed conditions of distress 
Wg = the percentage by which the bank's current demand deposits 
might decline under assumed conditions of distress 
Since R is a linear function of DD and TD + CD, a weight can be 
defined such that: 
(24) W,R = W.rDD + WLsTD + W, sCD 
I d  j  4  
Substituting (24) into (23) yields: 
(25) S = W-G + W.L - W, (l-s)CD - W^(l-s)TD - W, (l-r)DD - B 
L  Z  J  4  _ )  O  
can be expressed as a weighted average of the percentage of the 
current value of the bank's loans which would be available under condi­
tions of distress from each of the m loan categories. 
L (26) W- = S W.L. 
 ^ j=i 
L 
where : 
19 
= the percentage of the current value of the bank's present hold­
ings of j class loans which would be available under assumed 
conditions of distress 
Substituting (24) into (23) yields the following measure of soundness: 
l (27) = W-G + Z W.L. - W, (l-s)CD - %L(l-s)TD - W,(l-r)DD - B 
t z j_2 J J 4 5 b 
which is the specification of soundness which will be adhered to in this study. 
Liquidity 
The banker is concerned with liquidity because he must meet obliga­
tions as a routine aspect of his basr-neGo. ie evaluates the bank's 
liquidity position in terms of the bank's ability to meet obligations which 
will come due between the current period t, and his planning horizon, 
t + h. The obligations are: repayment of matured borrowings, redemption 
of matured certificates of deposit, deposit withdrawals, and loan requests. 
Strictly speaking the bank is not under a legal obligation to meet any 
requests for leans, but there may be favored borrowers whom the bank is 
most anxious to accommodate. These are the class of customers who main­
tain large deposits and whose continued patronage will enhance the bank's 
long-run profitability.^ 
At time t the banker is certain about the portion of borrowings and 
certificates of deposit which will be due between t and t + h. The banker 
is assumed to form subjective expectations at t, based on his past experi­
ence with the bank's cyclical and seasonal variations, about the level of 
^The discussion of long-run profits in the following section deals 
with the importance of bank customer relations in the banker's decision 
to grant or deny loan requests. 
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loan requests and deposit withdrawals between t and t + h. Maturing 
obligations, loans and deposit withdrawals are the uses of funds with 
which the banker must concern himself. He must make certain that the 
bank has enough funds to meet these obligations. 
Sources of funds which are available to the banker include: liquida­
tion of government securities, collection of matured loans, borrowings, 
increases in deposits, and the reserves freed by deposit withdrawals. If 
loan default is ignored, the banker is certain about the portion of the 
loan portfolio which will be repaid during t and t + h. However, he must 
form subjective expectations about the levels of certificates of deposit, 
deposits and borrowings which will exist at t + h. 
In this study, the banker is assumed to base his measure of liquidity 
on the difference between sources and uses of funds. Liquidity is defined 
as : 
(28) - E[6L] - XgCDf + E[ACD] - + E[AB] 
- X^Er(l-r)DD] + E[(l-r)6DD] - ^^E[(l-s)TD] 
+ E[(1-S)ATD] -Ac = 0 
which may be written as 
(29) + E[ACD + AB + (l-r)ADD + (l-s)ATD - AL 
- X^(l-r)DD - X^(1-S)TD] - - Aa = 0 
where : 
E = the expected value operator 
A = the change in the level indicated between t and t + h 
= the proportion of the total level of loans which will be 
collected between t and t + h 
^2 = the proportion of certificate of deposit holdings at t which 
will be redeemed between t and t + h 
= the proportion of borrowings at t which will be repaid between 
t and t + h 
= the proportion of demand deposits at t which will be withdrawn 
between t and t + h 
= the proportion of time and savings deposits at t which will be 
withdrawn between t and t + h 
a = the standard deviation of the distribution of [ACD + AB - AL 
+ (l-r)ADD + (l-s)ATD - >.^(l-r)DD - >,^(1-S)TD] 
A = the measure of liquidity 
the proportion of the total level of loans which will be collected 
between t and t + h, can be expressed as a weighted average of the propor-
.tion of loans collected from each loan class between t and t + h. 
(30) X = E j 
L 
where: 
Xj = the proportion of the level of j class loans which will be 
collected between t and t + h. 
Substituting (30) into (29) yields: 
^ L (31) G + Z X.L. + E[ACD + AB + (l-r)ADD + (l-s)ATD 
j=l j j 
m 
- A E L. - X, (l-r)DD - X Jl-s)TD] - X,CD 
j=l J " ^ 
- XgB^ - ACT = 0 
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Solving equation (30) for A, the measure of liquidity, yields: 
1 r ™ L 
(32) A=- G + E ^.L. + E[ACD + AB + (l-r)ADD + (l-s)ATD 
l t ] ] 
m n 
- L U  L .  -  X ^ ( l - r ) D D  -  X ^ ( l - s ) T D ]  -  X g C D ^  -  '  
j = l 
I f  we assume that the expectations are distributed with a known mean and 
variance, A is the only unknown in the equation and can be calculated. 
Long-run Profits 
Kane and Malkiel argue that the overall customer relationships is an 
important element that bankers must consider when making decisions about 
loan requests. They maintain that there exists a class of loan appiica-
* 8 
tions, L , such that; 
... a bank's L* applicants are those depositor-borrowers whose custom 
is afforded an important and favorable role in calculations of its 
expected profit and aggregate risk exposure. They are customers 
whose past behavior is characterized by their tendency to maintain 
stable or improving relationships. To turn down their requests for 
loans is to introduce explicit and calculable risks of customer 
alienation. 
The banker will be reluctant to alienate some customers by refusing 
to grant their loan requests because of the adverse effect that the denial 
g 
will have on long-run profits. Kane and Malkiel make this point explicit: 
... refusal of L* requests will also reduce the expected value 
of both short-run and long-run profits. 
g 
Edward J. Kane and Burton G. Malkiel, "Bank Portfolio Allocation, 
Deposit Variability and the Availability Doctrine," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, LXXIX (February, 1955), 120. 
^Ibid., p. 120. 
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The bank's long-run profits are also affected by the growth and de­
velopment of the community. The banker is free to differentiate amongst 
loan requests with respect to the impact that the use of the borrowed 
funds will have on regional economic development and hence, on the long-
run profit position of the bank. 
At any point in time the banker must concern himself with the viability 
of the bank as an on-going enterprise. The banker realizes that lending will 
not only affect the bank's short-run profit position but, in some cases, will 
enhance the bank's long-run profitability via improved customer relations 
and community development. Each individual loan, or class of loans, is thought 
to affect the bank's short-run profit, liquidity and soundness positions, 
and in addition it is postulated that there exists specific loans that will 
affect the bank's long-run profits. Long-run profits can be written as: 
(33) TT^ = TTj^(L) 
m 
By equation (4) L = Z L.; rr, can be written as: 
j=l ^ ^ 
m 
(34) TTf = TT, ( E L.) 
L t j=l j 
and 
m 
(35) drr^ = E -f" dL j = l,2,...,m 
L j=l J 
where : 
à 0 for j = j,2,...,m 
,1.. 
The total change in long-run profits resulting from changes in the level of 
loans, is the sum of the changes in long-run profits attributable to changes 
in the level of loans in each individual loan class. Some classes of loans 
bttl 
have no effect on long-run profits. For those cases —^ = 0. 
^ J 
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The total differential of the utility function describes the changes 
in utility when any or all of the variables in the utility function change. 
The total differential of the utility function may be expressed as: 
(3*) = a: dn + ds + ^ 9 da 
Given that FC is a constant, drr is given by: 
m 
(37) dTT = gdG + E p.dL. - vdTD - bdB - cdCD 
j = l J J 
The total derivative of soundness is: 
L  (38) dS = W  dG + S W.dL. - W (l-s)dCD - W (l-s)dTD 
j=l j j 
- W,(l-r)dDD - dB 
m 
If we assume c constant, E[ACD + AB + (l-r)6DD + (l-s)ATD - ^ Z L. 
j=i : 
- x^ ( l - r ) D D  - x^ ( 1 -s)T D1 constant, and the maturity structure of the bank's 
portfolio constant ^2 ; constant), the total derivative of liquidity 
reduces to: 
m 
(39) dA = - [dG + S À dL. - X dCD - X dB ] 
CT j=l : j 
The total derivative of drr^ is given by equation (35). 
Substituting equations (35), (37), (38) and (39) into (35) yields: 
(4°) - — ^gdG + S P.dL. - vdTD - bdB - cdCol + 
j=l J J 
= a;
ôn zn T  
+ •^1 W.dG + 2 W^dL. - W, (l-s)dCD - W ri-s)dTD 
2 J .] 4 5 
- W,(l-r)dDD - dBl+|y- TdG + Z X^dL. - X.dCD-X.dB 
6  J  d A  c  L  J J  2  3 - J  
J-J-
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+ 
%  
Ô T T ,  
m ÔTT_ 
L j=l -j 
Factoring equation (40) yields the following total derivative of the 
utility function: 
(41) dU + dG .1^  s + h + if - dtd [|^  V + ii WGCL-S)] 3tt 
- •= + s + 3a o - ddd w^ d-r) j 
+ Pi + i "1 •*• "i a  ^
+ dL 
'2 [ 3TT ^2 3S "2 
au „L , su 1 , L 
- + aâ; 4  +^ % ]  
r su au „L , 3U 1 L 
+ 4^nLlâ;Pm+ âs "m + :âÂ;tm + IkT 
art,-, 
"et 
L m 
Equation (41) can be written as: 
(42) du . dC +is «2 + - (H™ W;(l-s)j 
-dCD [-^ c + § W^(l-s) + -^ J >2] - àW [g WjCl-r) j 
- d» [#: b +-#+ îa a ^ ]] 
+ pj + 3§ "j + iBïa'y + ir] 
arr^  
'l j 
for j  =  1 ,2,.. . , k,.,. ,m 
The desired level of loans is that level which yields the banker 
maximum utility under the constraints imposed by the bank's balance sheet 
identity. The necessary (first order) condition for utility maximization 
is that dU = 0 for all variations which satisfy the balance sheet identity. 
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(43) dG + dL = (1-r) dDD + (1-s) dTD + (l-s)dCD + dB 
which can be written as: 
m 
(44) dG + S dL. = (l-r)dDD + (l-s)dTD + (l-s)dCD + dB 
j=l : 
m 
Solving equation (44) for T, dL. yields: 
j=l J 
m 
(45) T, dL. = (l-r)dDD + (l-s)dTD + (l-s)dCD + dB - dG 
j=l J 
Under the assumption that the bank is faced with an increase in 
m 
loan demand from only one customer, a class k borrower, S dL. = dL, 
j=l ^ 
and (45) can be written as: 
(46) dl^ = (1-r) dDD + (l-s)dTD + (l-s)dCD + dB - dG 
Substituting (46) into (42) imposes the condition of the balance sheet 
identity on the model and yields: 
(47) du = dG [|% g + W; + - ZrD[|% v + W,(l_s) 
-dCD [1^ c + f W^(l-s) + Ix J xj - dDD [g Wg(l-r)] 
- db b + x,] 
+ [(l-r)dDD + (l-s)dTD + (l-s)dCD + dB - dGj 
[Is PK + I? "K IA A âlj] 
Factoring and simplifying equation (47) results in: 
(48) dU = dG [gc-p,) + If (W,-W^) + If - 1^ 
* [a;^ pk-v-pks)a§f"k-"5)<i-s) + sa a + 
au "^l - 1 
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5 < - ,  
L k 
'su , ôu,„l ,, , , ôu 
+ l&7 pk + â?^ "k-^ 6^  ^ (1"^ ) 
"Su, , , , 3u,_L , âu 1,. L . , , ôu_ ^1 
l^ 
+ 4b Lâ;^ pk-b) + â|("k-i) + âa + â;- âi^ u 
The first order conditions for utility maximization require that dU = 0 
for all variations in the independent variables. Thus each quantity in 
brackets in (48) must equal zero. 
(49) [|^(g-pk) + E(^ 2-"k) + Ia -1;^  âï^ j = 0 
(50) l#f(pk-v-:pk) + la^ ("k-"5)(l-:) + ; kk 
+ ^  ^ a-s)j = o 
L 
L k 
02) [i Pk + i <-"6) + % - » 
iB <v') + i + i <4-^3» +1% = ° 
The first-order conditions of equations (49) through (53) give the 
bankers general equilibrium response to an increase in loan requests. 
They give the relations which must hold in the general case when the banker 
is faced with an increase in demand for loans. In order to discover the 
relations considered by the banker when deciding amongst the various means 
of adjusting to the desired level of lending, alternative restrictions will 
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be imposed on the model. 
If we assume that the banker is faced with an increase in loan 
demand and he considers making up the increase in demand by selling 
government securities, the balance sheet identity requires that: 
(54) dl^ = -dG 
The change in utility is given by: 
(55) dU = dL. 
+ dG 
•an „ + m ^ ot 1 l ^  ml 
.Stt k 3S k 3A CT k drr^  J 
3U , ÔU l"! 
k 
— E + — + — i 
-ôrr ÔS ÔA aJ 
and since dL^ = -dG by (54), (55) can be written as: 
(56) du = -dG g Pk + § wj + fa i xj + |L 3] 
dG , au + su 
.ÔTT ® 3S 2 èA ctJ 
which reduces to: 
(57) dU = dG 
, 5u 
Ë + i + i ;<4-" 
3TT. 
the first order conditions require that: 
(58) ipk-s/ " 26 '"k-"2/ " ba ë '"k 
su B (pj^ -g) +§  ^° 
If we make a realistic assumption that the interest rate on loans is 
greater than the government securities rate of interest, p^ is greater 
than g and is positive. is considered greater than W^, therefore 
is negative. Not all classes of loans contribute to long-run profits, 
ôttl su 
so that TT- 2 0. T;— Z 0 implies that -r— s 0 according as the 
si^  si^  stt^  
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inequality is read from the top down. 
Equation (58) implies that loans will be made if the positive utility 
received from short-run profits, and possibly long-run profits, offsets the 
disutility incurred from soundness and liquidity considerations. From the 
relations implied by (59), one could reasonably infer that bankers with 
"sounder" borrowers and with borrowers who are in a position to contribute 
to the long-run profitability of the bank will grant more loan requests, 
than bankers with less advantaged customers. 
Expressions similar to (58) can be written for situations in which 
the banker adjusts his position using each of the other possible sources 
available to him. The possibilities are: dL^ = (l-r)dDD, dl^ = (l-s)TD, 
dL^ = (l-s)dCD and dl^ = dB. The expressions are respectively: 
5 - 0  
(62) |a +1 («^D + If 1 (X^-X3> + 5 ° 
When a banker is faced with an increase in demand for loans, he is 
not constrained to increase his reserves from only one source of funds as 
was done in deriving expressions (58) through (62). He can adjust his 
position with any combination of sources available to him. 
If the banker wishes to increase his lending by selling government 
securities and selling certificates of deposit, the balance sheet re­
quires that: 
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(63) dl^ = (l-s)dCD - dG 
The change in utility is given by: 
"3u 3u „l , 3u 1 , l , au l^1 
(64) s pk 3s "k m â 
- dCD [g c + § (l-s)W^ + Ik a *2] 
Substituting (l-s)dCD - dG for dL^ in (64) and simplifying yields: 
(65) dU = dCD pj^(l-s)-c + W^(l-s3 - W^(l-s) 
+ dG [g (g-p^) + f (Wj-W^) + |2 i (1-X^) + ^  
The first order conditions are: 
(66) 32 p^^i_s)_c + w^d-s) - W^Cl-s) + 32 i x^Xl-s)-X2 
(S7) I; (S-Pk) + ("2-"%) + 1% ; = 0 
The first order conditions can be written as: 
(68) 1^ p^(l-s)-c + (P^-S) + § wj^(l-s) - W^(l-s) + (W^-W^) 
+ k^^ -s)-^ 2 + %r ^ -e) = 0 
L K. 
Expressions similar to (68) can be written for situations in which 
the banker adjusts his position with other combinations of sources avail­
able to him. The possibilities considered here are: = -dG + dB and 
dL^ = (l-s)dCD + B. The expressions are respectively: 
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(69) |2 [(p^-b) + (Pi,-g)j +§ + *k-"2)] 
sa a  ^% 3l^  = ° 
^ lu i 
wj(l-s)-w^(l-s) + (W^-l)j (70) [pk(l-s)-c + (Pk-t^+ 
_x^ (l-s)-l2 +  ^(2-3) = » _l ^  1 
ba a 
Equations (68), (69) and (70) identify the variables which a banker must 
evaluate when he considers increasing his desired level of lending by the 
combinations: selling certificates of deposits and government securities, 
borrowing and selling government securities, and borrowing and selling 
certificates of deposit. The variables are: [p^(l-s)-c + (p^-g)] 
[wj(l-s)-w^(l-s) + (W^-Wg)], [\^(l-s)-^2 + a' 1^' Is §A' 
Regardless of what combination of sources of funds a utility maxi­
mizing banker chooses in determining his desired level of lending, he must 
weigh the total effects of the proposed transactions on his utility. That 
is, he must consider the impact the lending will have on the bank's short-
run profits, soundness position, liquidity position and long-run profits. 
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CHAPTER III: 
THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The theoretical model developed in the previous section implies that 
if a regional differential impact of monetary policy exists, it will mani­
fest itself in lending behavior of bankers. When money becomes scarce, 
bankers with the economically advantaged customers will grant more re­
quests for loans than bankers with weaker customers. The bankers with the 
strong customers will forego the purchase of securities and also will 
borrow money in order to satisfy customer requests for loans. Bankers 
with marginal customers will not sell securities or borrow money in order 
to satisfy the demand for loans. 
The hypothesis that, during periods of tight money, there is rela­
tively less lending in small rural areas than in large metropolitan areas 
ultimately turns on the willingness of banks to satisfy individuals re­
quests for loans. Ideally a test of the hypothesis should be based on 
data describing: changes in individual bank portfolios, the characteris­
tics of individual borrowers, and the terms of each individual loan. Such 
detailed data was not available for this study.^ Although data of the 
individual decision makers (lenders and borrowers) could not be found, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Bank Operating Statistics does 
provide bank portfolio data disaggregated on a regional basis. It was this 
data that was used to test the regional differential impact hypothesis. 
^An unsuccessful attempt was made to obtain the Federal Reserve System 
data that was used for the major studies it conducted on commercial and in­
dustrial loans in 1955 and 1957, Bank disclosure laws made it impossible 
to use the data for this study. 
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In States that do not have statewide branch banking, bank portfolio 
statistics are given for each of the local areas in the state. The FDIC 
2 
defines local areas as: 
The area definition most frequently used in this report is the 
State Economic Area (SEA), described by the Bureau of Census as 
a county or group of counties, within a state, which are homo­
geneous in general livelihood and socio-economic characteristics. 
Where there is sufficient overlapping of branch banking systems 
among SEAs, these areas have been combined to make one larger area. 
The FDIC has compiled bank portfolio statistics for the years 1967, 
1968, 1969 and 1970. Many of the definitions of specific loan categories 
and securities-held categories were revised at various times, particularly 
in 1968. The revisions make yearly comparisons prior to 1969 difficult. 
While the statistics that were used in this study will be described in the 
subsequent section, the following is a sample of the data published in 
Bank Operating Statistics: 
(1) the value of government securities held by banks in each local 
area 
(2) the value of state and municipal obligations held by banks in 
each local area 
(3) the value of loans made by banks in each local area by type 
of loan such as commercial and industrial loans, agriculture 
loans, real estate loans and loans to individuals. 
Annual percentage increases in these variables are also given. Although 
the problem of aggregation is not completely solved, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation statistics do allow stratification by region, which 
is the central focus of this investigation. 
o 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Operating Statistics, 
explanatory notes. 
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In order to discover the effects of monetary ease and stringency on 
bank lending in regions of different population size, it is necessary to 
categorize and define the local areas by two distinctly different criteria. 
First, the local areas must be identified by their population size to allow 
stratification of the sample by population size. Secondly, they must be 
identified according to the degree of monetary tightness or ease which 
they are experiencing to allow stratification according to monetary ease 
and tightness. 
Although this study is primarily concerned with comparing and con­
trasting the effects of monetary policy on large metropolitan centers and 
on the small hinterlands, the data also lends itself to the investigation 
of the impact of monetary policy on areas which fall in the middle range, 
those urban areas which lie in the middle of the spectrum between the 
huge metropolitan centers and the small rural places. Any criterion 
chosen to designate an area as either metropolitan, urban, or rural will of 
necessity be somewhat arbitrary. There are no clear-cut definitions which 
are suitable for all studies. 
The areas defined in the FDIC's Bank Operating Statistics are composed 
of socioeconomic homogeneous counties. In this study, an FDIC locai area 
was defined to be "metropolitan" if the population of its largest county 
exceeded 500,000 in the 1970 census. A local area was designated as 
"urban" if the population of its largest county was less than 500,000 
but greater than 150,000. All other local areas were classified as "rural". 
The definitions were in part dictated by the needs of the study. It 
would have been preferable to be able to include only the very largest 
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areas in the population of metropolitan areas. Admittedly, the disparity 
in size between ar area whose largest county contains a population of 
500,000 and the industrial centers of New York and Chicago is great. 
However, if only the large megalopolises were included in the population 
of metropolitan areas, there would have been too few observations to do 
any meaningful statistical analysis. As it is, this definition yielded a 
population of only forty metropolitan areas from which to sample. 
With the areas defined according to a size criteria, the next step 
is to delineate the areas according to their degree of monetary ease or 
stringency. Once each area can be defined by these two classifications, 
a sample can be stratified to yield observations on: metropolitan areas 
experiencing tight monetary conditions (TM areas), metropolitan areas 
experiencing relatively easier monetary conditions (EM areas), urban areas 
under tight money conditions (TU areas), urban areas experiencing easier 
monetary conditions (EU areas), rural areas experiencing tight monetary 
conditions (TR areas), and finally rural areas under easier monetary 
conditions (ER areas). Such a stratification allows for the development 
of statistical models designed to test the relative effectiveness of tight 
money on bank lending in metropolitan, rural and urban regions. 
Measures of Bank Tightness 
While the classification of regions as either metropolitan, urban or 
rural was difficult, classifying them as "tight money" or "easy money" 
regions is a much more formidable task. Objective measures for such a 
classification are difficult to define. Whether or not a bank is tight 
or loose for lending purposes is a subjective decision that is made by 
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the banker. Because of the subjective nature of the lending decision. 
Bach and Huizenga reject the normally used measures, excess reserves and 
3 
free reserves, as indicators of bank tightness or looseness. 
For explaining banker (lender) behavior, how tight a bank is 
depends on how tight the banker (decision-maker) feels it is. 
One bank may be extremely tight for lending purposes, even 
though it has a large volume of excess reserves and liquid securi­
ties, if the banker believes that these reserves and securities 
are essential to the sound operation of the bank. Another bank 
may be loose for lending purposes even though it has very small 
excess reserves and only a modest supply of liquid securities, 
if the banker feels that he nevertheless has more reserves and 
securities than he needs for normal operating purposes (assum­
ing that he is within standard examination regulations). Thus, 
standard measures like excess reserves and free reserves are 
not reliable measures of a banks tightness for lending purposes. 
Bach and Huizenga suggest that percentage changes in deposits is an 
4 
adequate measure of change in bank tightness. 
For the individual bank as distinguished from the banking system, 
it is primarily gain or loss of deposits which makes the banks 
looser or tighter for new lending and investment. Therefore, 
the simplest measure of whether an individual bank is growing 
looser or tighter is the extent to which it is gaining or 
losing reserves. 
The percentage change in deposits is the criteria which will be used here 
to designate whether a region is becoming looser or tighter. 
Ideally, it would be best for the purposes of this study to choose 
areas for the sample from different geographical locations for each of 
the six categories. In other words, each of the individual units in the 
TM, TU, TR, EM, EU, and ER categories would be from different geographical 
locations, with no one location contributing more than one observation to 
3 
Bach and Huizenga, "Differential Impact", p. 54. 
'^Ibid., p. 56. 
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any category. The problem of one geographical area dominating any parti­
cular category would be prevented. Thus it could be said with more 
assurance that the results of this study hold for metropolitan, urban and 
rural regions in general, rather than, say, only for metropolitan areas on 
the east coast. Unfortunately, the small population of metropolitan and 
urban areas prevented the selection of metropolitan and urban areas for 
the sample on anything otî-c" then the percentage change in deposits 
criteria. 
Percentage changes in deposits from 1969 to 1970 were calculated for 
each of the local areas. The areas in the metropolitan and urban cate­
gories were ranked from high to low according to the percentage increase in 
deposits. The ten metropolitan areas and ten urban areas with the small­
est increase in deposits were chosen for the sample to represent metro­
politan and urban regions under tight monetary conditions - categories 
TM and TR respectively. Likewise, the ten metropolitan and ten urban 
areas with the greatest increase in deposits were chosen for the sample 
to represent metropolitan and urban areas under easier monetary conditions 
- categories EM and EU respectively. Rural areas of comparable percentage 
changes in deposits as the TM areas were chosen to represent rural areas 
under tight monetary conditions - category TR. Rural areas of comparable 
percentage increase in deposits as EM areas were chosen for the sample 
to represent rural areas under easier monetary conditions - category ER. 
The national average increase in deposits from 1969 to 1970 was 
10.3%. The average increase in deposits for regions designated as tight 
was 4.10% and the average for regions designated as loose was 17.4%. 
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Whether a difference of 13.3% increase in deposits is enough to differ­
entiate between "tight" and "loose" regions cannot be answered a priori. 
But hopefully it will be enough to enable statistical tests to pick up 
any meaningful differences that may exist in regional bank lending be­
havior during periods of tight and easy money. This study assumes that 
consumer demand patterns within region size categories are essentially 
the same. It is assumed, for example, that the demand for credit in tight 
rural areas is the same for easy rural areas. Furthermore, it is also 
assumed that differences in changes in deposits among areas is attributable 
to changes in the rate of growth of the money supply resulting from the 
actions of the monetary authorities. Strictly speaking changes in deposits 
could result from changing economic conditions within a region which also 
would effect demand. The specific areas chosen for the sample are given 
in the Appendix. 
The Statistical Model 
In order to determine if a differential exists, an analysis of vari­
ance experiment was performed to compare regional bank portfolios under 
conditions of tight money with those under easier monetary conditions. 
The model is of the following form: 
(71) y.jk = u + *1 + bj + (eeo.j + gijk 
where is the added effect of the i. th A treatment (i = 1, 2,..., a); 
is the added effect of the j th B treatment (j = 1, 2,..., b). is 
the added effect of the interaction of the _i th A treatment and j. th B 
treatinent. g. is the experimental error and the only random component 
on the right hand side of equation (71). The factors and (q'B)^^^ 
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are assumed to be fixed and g. has an expected value of zero and ijk 
2 
variance rr • Y.., is the k th observation of variable Y under treatment 
e ijk 
combination (k = 1, 2,,.., n). In this experiment, i = (1, 2); 
j = (1, 2,..., 10); A = monetary factor; B = region size factor; and: 
a = the total number of levels of factor A 
b = the total number of levels of factor B 
where : 
= easier monetary conditions 
a^ = tight monetary conditions 
b^ = metropolitan areas 
b^ = urban areas 
b^ = rural areas 
The expected values of mean squares and tests of hypothesis for the experi­
ment are given in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Expected Values of Mean Squares 
Source of Variation E(MS) 
Hypothesis 
being 
tested 
F ratios 
Main effect of factor A 
Main effect of factor B 
AXB interaction 
error 
2 , kbz/y 
^ ^  a-1 
2 , kal S 
^ b-1 
a + 
(a-1)(b-1) 
2 
(J 
HO: Icy. = 0 
i ^ 
MS /MS 
a error 
HO: 2 0. = 0 
f i 0 : e f e f l ) y = 0  
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Of special interest is the AB interaction which measures the failure 
of the response to A, monetary ease and tightness, to be the same for 
each level of B, the size of region. Ten different bank portfolio 
variables were tested to determine if differences in A on metropolitan 
areas (b^), urban areas (b^), and rural areas (b^) are statistically sig­
nificant. The test of the simple effect of A on b^ determines if there 
are any significant differences between tight metropolitan areas and easy 
metropolitan areas. Likewise, the test of the simple effect of A on bg 
(by) determines if there are any significant differences between tight 
urban (rural) areas. 
Tests on four security ass^L variables and on six loan variables 
were performed to determine if bank lending and bank purchases of securi­
ties in tight money regions is significantly different than in easier 
money regions. Heterogeneity of the variances within regions necessitated 
that the variables be measured in percentage changes. As with percentage 
changes in deposits, the following variables are measured as percentage 
changes from 1969 to 1970: 
(1) U.S. Treasury Securities 
(2) Other U.S. Government Agency Securities 
(3) Obligations of States and Municipalities 
(4) Other Securities 
(5) Residential Real Estate Loans 
(6) Other Real Estate Loans 
(7) Commercial and Industrial Loans 
(8) Agriculture Loans 
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(9) Loans to Individuals to Purchase Automobiles 
(10) Other Loans to Individuals 
If it is true that the larger regions have the sounder borrowers, 
the theory suggests that increases in the purchases of securities in 
general, and specifically U.S. government securities, should be signi­
ficantly less in tight metropolitan areas than in easy metropolitan areas. 
Increases in commercial and industrial loans should not be significantly 
different in tight and easy metropolitan areas. 
It is expected that banks in rural areas with their weaker business 
customers will not be as anxious to satisfy requests for commercial and 
industrial loans. Tests should reveal no statistical difference in the 
purchase of securities between tight and easy rural areas and signifi­
cantly less commercial and industrial lending in tight rural areas than 
in easy rural areas is expected. In view of the importance of customer 
relations to the bank's long-run survival, agricultural loans, which are 
most important to rural bankers, are expected to be less affected by 
tight money conditions. 
Urban banks undoubtedly have stronger customers than rural banks, 
although they probably do not have sounder customers than metropolitan 
banks. If the urban areas are more like metropolitan areas than they 
are like rural areas, increases in the purchases of securities should be 
significantly less in tight urban areas than in easy urban areas. Like­
wise tight money should not significantly effect commercial and industrial 
loans. Agriculture loans are probably not the most important loan cate­
gory for urban bankers. It is expected that increases in agriculture 
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loans will be significantly less in tight urban areas than in easy-
urban areas. Loans to individuals in all regions should be very responsive 
to tight monetary conditions. The difference in increases in loans to 
individuals in tight money regions is expected to be significantly less 
than that in easy money regions. When money becomes scarce bankers in 
metropolitan, urban and rural areas will reduce their loans to individuals 
in order to satisfy their regular business customers. 
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CHAPTER IV; 
the empirical results 
Brief Overview of the Findings 
For the most part, the empirical test results conformed to expected 
results suggested by the theoretical model of Chapter II. It was expected 
that tight money conditions would press more heavily on bank lending in 
smaller regions than in larger regions. The percentage increase in commer­
cial and industrial loans in both tight rural areas and tight urban areas 
was significantly less than in easy rural areas and easy urban areas re­
spectively. Although the average percentage change in commercial and in­
dustrial loans was negative for tight metropolitan areas and positive for 
easy metropolitan areas, the difference was not statistically significant. 
It seems that tight money conditions has a little or no impact on commer­
cial and industrial loans in metropolitan areas. 
Agriculture loans In either metropolitan, rural or urban regions 
did not seem to be affected by tight money conditions. When money becomes 
scarce, rural bankers can be expected to favor their agricultural cus­
tomers and take special measures to keep this category of borrowers satis­
fied. However, one would not expect this to be the case for metropolitan 
and urban bankers. If monetary conditions had been tighter during this 
period, perhaps the banks in the large industrial centers would have shut 
out the agricultural borrowers in favor of commercial and industrial 
customers as expected. 
In all three regions, metropolitan, urban, and rural, consumer auto­
mobile loans were very responsive to tight money conditions. In each 
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case the average percentage change in consumer automobile loans was nega­
tive for tight money regions and positive for easy money regions. In 
view of the importance of the bank's continuing customer relations with 
its important business borrowers and soundness considerations, it is not 
surprising to find that requests for consumer automobile loans are the 
most likely to be denied when money becomes scarce. 
Bank lending for the two categories of real estate loans, residential 
real estate loans, which includes multi-family properties and "other" real 
estate loans, which includes industrial and business real estate loans, 
was not much different in tight regions than in easy regions. Tight metro­
politan and tight rural areas were net statistically different than easy 
metropolitan areas and easy rural areas in either of the two real estate 
loan categories. The percent change in "other real estate loans" was 
significantly less in tight urban areas than in easy urban areas. The same 
occurred for residential real estate loans in urban areas. The percent 
change in tight urban areas was significantly less than in easy urban areas. 
Apparently tight money more readily curtails urban residential construction 
than either metropolitan or rural residential construction. 
The average percentage increase in securities held by banks was 
significantly less in tight metropolitan areas than in easy metropolitan 
areas for three of the four security asset categories. The average per­
centage increase in securities held by urban banks was significantly less 
in tight urban areas than in easy urban areas for two of the four securi­
ty asset categories. The average percentage increase in securities held 
by tight rural banks was not significantly different than easy rural banks 
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for any of the four security asset categories tested. It seems that 
the larger the region the more willing the banks are to hold fewer 
securities during tight money in order to grant loan requests. Rural 
banks are the least willing to forego purchase of securities when 
money gets tight. If it can be inferred that rural bankers have 
weaker customers than urban or metropolitan bankers, the rural bankers 
are behaving rationally by not taking special measures to grant loans 
to weak business customers. 
The Empirical Test Results 
Results of the statistical tests are to be found in Tables 2 
through 4 in the Appendix. Test results of the analysis of variance 
of the interaction model Y... = ^ + g. + (cvS) . . + g. are given ijk 1 j lj 
in Table 2. The results of the analysis of variance of the simple 
main effects are given in Table 3. Interaction means are found in 
Table 4. 
In contrast to the behavior of banks in metropolitan and urban 
areas, an examination of the test results reveals that the percentage 
increase in the holdings of securities in tight rural banks was not 
significantly less than in easy rural banks. Fig. 4.1 below, a 
geometric representation of the interactions of monetary conditions 
and region size, shows that the effects of tight and easy money for 
the variable Percentage Increase in Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securi­
ties is more pronounced in metropolitan and urban areas than in rural 
areas. 
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20 T 
Response 
Scale 
(Means) 
15 
10 
5 --
= metropolitan 
Dg = urDan 
= rural 
v. 
\ 
\ 
(easy money) (tight money) 
Fig. 4.1. Interaction for Percentage Change in Holdings 
of U.S. Treasury Securities 
As Fig. 4.1 illustrates, there is a difference in the magnitude of 
regional response to tight money. Tests of the simple main effects of 
monetary conditions, Factor A, on metropolitan regions (b^), urban 
regions (b^) and rural regions (b^) showed that: the simple effects of 
A on b^ and b^ was significant at 0.01 level. However, the effect of A 
on b^ was insignificant. 
Similar results were obtained for the variable. Percentage Increase 
in the Holdings of Obligations of States and Municipalities. Again, as 
Fig. 4.2 illustrates, there is a difference in the magnitude of the 
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b^ = urban 
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V. 
n 
\ b. 
. "i 
b. 
(Easy Money) (Tight Money) 
Fig. 4.2. Interaction for Percentage Change in Holdings 
of Obligations of States and Municipalities 
regional response to tight money conditions. The increase in bank hold­
ings of state and municipal obligations was significantly less in tight 
metropolitan and tight urban areas than in easy metropolitan and easy 
urban areas respectively. Although the percentage increase was less for 
tight rural areas than for easy rural areas, the difference was not 
statistically significant. 
The simple main effects of monetary conditions (A) on metropolitan 
and urban areas was significant at the 0.01 level. The test of simple 
main effects of A on did not reveal any significant differences. 
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The variable, Percentage Increase in Holdings of Other U.S. Agency-
Securities, exhibited a different differential response than the first 
two security asset variables tested. The simple main effect of monetary 
conditions on metropolitan areas proved to be significant at the 0.10 
level, but the simple main effects of monetary conditions on urban and 
rural areas was statistically insignificant. The simple main effect on 
urban and rural areas was statistically insignificant. In this case, as 
Fig. 4.3 indicates, there is a change in direction as well as a change 
in the magnitude of response. The average percent increase in Holdings of 
Other U.S. Agency Securities was greater for tight metropolitan areas than 
for easy metropolitan areas. This response is the opposite of urban and 
rural response. 
It appears that tight metropolitan banks are willing to hold fewer 
U.S. treasury securities and fewer state and municipal bonds, but they 
will hold more securities of other U.S. government agencies than easy 
metropolitan banks. As a percentage of securities held, securities of 
other U.S. government agencies is quite small, and the overall response 
of tight metropolitan banks is to hold fewer securities than easy metro­
politan banks. 
The variable. Percentage Change in Other Securities, which as far as 
can be ascertained from the explanatory notes in Bank Operating Statistics 
is simply the percentage change in corporate bonds held by banks, was 
immune to changes in monetary conditions. There was no statistical differ­
ence between any of the tight money and easy money regions. The simple 
effects of monetary conditions on metropolitan, urban, and rural regions 
was statistically insignificant. 
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Fig. 4.3. Interaction for Percentage Change in Holdings 
of Other U.S. Government Agency Securities 
Agricultural loans were also shown to be somewhat unresponsive to 
monetary conditions. The simple main effects of monetary conditions on 
region size were statistically insignificant. There was no indication of 
a differential impact in this loan category. 
Neither was there a differential impact with respect to consumer 
automobile loans. Metropolitan, urban, and rural regions all responded in 
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much the same way. The average percentage change in consumer automobile 
loans was negative in each of the tight money regions. The simple main 
effects of money on metropolitan, urban, and rural regions was signifi­
cant at the 0.01 level. It appears that bankers in all regions reduce 
the number of consumer automobile loans significantly when money gets 
tight. 
The percentage change in commercial and industrial loans in tight 
metropolitan areas was essentially the same as easy metropolitan areas. 
The simple main effects of monetary conditions on metropolitan areas was 
statistically insignificant. The percentage change in commercial and 
industrial loans was significantly less for tight urban areas and tight 
rural areas than for easy urban areas and easy rural areas. Fig. 4.4 
illustrates these relations. The simple main effects of money on urban 
areas was significant at the 0.05 level. The test of the simple main 
effect of money on rural areas revealed significant differences between 
tight rural areas and easy rural areas at the O.Ol level. 
The F scores of the simple main effects of monetary conditions on 
metropolitan areas and on rural areas were statistically insignificant. 
The same results held for the variable other real estate loans. The 
simple effects of A on metropolitan areas and rural areas was not signif­
icant. The simple main effects of monetary conditions on urban areas was 
significant at the 0.01 level for residential real estate loans and at 
the 0.05 level for other real estate loans. The percentage increase in 
both categories of raal estate loans was significantly less in urban areas 
experiencing tight monetary conditions than urban areas experiencing 
easier monetary conditions. 
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Loans 
Summary and Conclusions. 
Twenty local areas were chosen for the sample to represent metro­
politan areas, twenty were designated as urban areas, and twenty local 
areas represented rural areas. Of the twenty areas in each region, i.e., 
metropolitan, rural and urban, ten were designated tight money areas and 
ten were designated easier money areas according to the percentage change 
in deposits criteria. It was assumed that, other than differences in 
local bank changes in deposits, the tight areas were the same in all major 
respects as the easy areas. Differences in percentage increases in 
securities and loans then are mainly attributable to the local bankers' 
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evaluation of the soundness of their customers and importance they attach 
to each loan request in terms of their own utility maximization. 
The major finding was that tight money did not effect business loans 
in metropolitan areas to any great degree. Urban and rural bankers in 
tight money areas were reluctant to maintain the same level of commercial 
and industrial loans as urban and rural bankers in easy money areas. 
Regional economic growth is based on industrial and commercial expansion. 
As the industrial base of a region expands and employment increases, 
commercial businesses find it profitable to operate. Tertiary activities, 
such as real estate development, and supportive service industries are 
attracted to growing regions; they cannot exist when the industrial or 
commercial foundation of a region declines. If tight money curtails 
regional economic growth by reducing the growth of commercial and indus­
trial loans, as it apparently does in smaller regions, the basic economic 
structure of the smaller regions is weakened. Regional economic activity 
supported by the structure also suffers. If the interpretation of the 
results is correct, the smaller regions are relatively worse off than the 
metropolitan regions. It would be of interest to conduct a similar 
future study based on FDIC data to determine if these results hold only 
for the 1969-1970 period, or if they are indicative of a definite cyclical 
pattern. However, studies such as this one are, in themselves, incomplete. 
In order to discover the precise regional impact of monetary policy, data 
which will enable investigators to estimate regional loan demand curves 
must be gathered and made available. 
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This study suffers from not being able to determine the extent to 
which differences in changes in bank deposits among regions can be 
attributable to relative differences in regional economic activity rather 
than changes in monetary policy and from failing to isolate regional 
demand for loans. It could be the case, for example, that relatively 
greater loans to individuals for automobile purchases in easy money 
areas than in tight money areas reflects relative differences in economic 
prosperity between tight money areas and easy money areas, and is not 
solely attributable to portfolio adjustments by bankers in tight money 
areas. The consistency of the results with the theory, however, suggests 
further studies incorporating regional demand for loan functions might 
be used to determine the magnitude of the regional differential impact. 
For policy purposes, the question of a regional differential impact does 
deserve further study. If the results in this study are any indication, 
monetary policy does not press down evenly on all sectors and regions 
of the economy. The extent to which some regions will have to bear a 
greater burden to curtail inflation should be determined. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE I 
FDIC LOCAL AREAS CHOSEN 7OR. TEE SAMPLE 
Tight 
Metropolitan 
Areas 
Tight 
Urban 
Areas 
Tight 
Rural 
Areas 
Easy 
Metropolitan 
Areas 
Easy 
Urban 
Areas 
Easy 
Rural 
Areas 
D.C. Ga. (05) Ind. (08) Ala. (02) Col. (01) Ark. (02) 
Ind. (06) Fla. (05) Kan. (01) Fla. (09) Fla. (06) Ark. (03) 
Mo. (10) la. (12) Minn. (01) 111. (13) 111. (15) Col. (07) 
N.Y. (01) Kan. (09) Mo. (09) La. (06) Ind. (05) Ga. (02) 
N.Y. (08) N.J. (03) N.D. (01) Mass. (01) N.Y. (02) Ga. (03) 
Ohio (12) CXiio (05) N.D. (02) Ohio (10) N.M. (04) Ken. (04) 
Ohio (13) Ohio (08) Ctiio (03) Okla. (12) N.Y. (03) Mich. (01) 
Ohio (17) Œiio (11) Ohio (15) Penn. (01) Tex. (17) Okla. (02) 
Tex. (01) Ohio (14) Okla. (09) Tex. (14) Tex. (21) Okla. (07) 
Tex. (08) Tex. (19) 
1 
Tex. (01) Tex. (18) Tex. (23) w.v. (02) 
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TABLE 2 
F RATIOS^ FOR THE INTERACTION MODEL 
Variables 
Source of Variation 
A B AS 
U.S. Treasury 21 .107 0.996 1.914 
Securities (0 .0001) (0.622) (0.155) 
Other U.S. Government 0 .008 1.376 2.789 
Agency Securities (0 .926) (0.261) (0.069) 
Obligations of 18 .675 3.654 1.625 
States, etc. (0 .002) (0.032) (0.205) 
Other Securities 1, .226 3.730 0.457 
(0. 272) (0.029) (0.642) 
Residential Real 4. 577 3.351 3.263 
Estate Loans (0. 035) (0.041) (0.045) 
Other Real Estate 0, .326 0.461 2.217 
Loans (0. 577) (0.638) (0.117) 
Commercial and 13. 996 6.249 1.069 
Industrial Loans (0. 0007) (0.004) (0.3515) 
Agriculture Loans 0. 050 1.591 0.202 
(0. 828) (0.212) (0.820) 
Loans to Individuals to 33. 856 8.559 0.095 
Purchase Automobiles (0. 0001) (0.009) (0.098) 
Other Loans to 4. 330 7.270 0.550 
Individuals (0. 040) (0.002) (0.583) 
xhe probability of a greater F score for each source of variations is 
given in parentheses below each calculated F score. 
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TABLE 3 
F RATIOS^ FŒl THE SIMPLE EFFECTS OF 
ON b^, bg AND b^ 
Source of Variation 
Variables 
(bp 
Metropolitan 
(b2) 
Urban Rural 
U.S. Treasury-
Securities 
12.740** 
(92.51) 11.952** 1.251 
Other U.S. Government 
Agency Securities 
3.02* 
(6545.22) 2.465 0.104 
Obligations of 
States, etc. 
4.75* 
(254.67) 15.2** 1.980 
Other Securities 0.007 
(13706.97) 1.723 0.415 
Residential Real 
Estate Loans 
0.284 
(246.52) 9.47** 1.347 
Other Real Estate 
Loans 
1.126 
(849.30) 3.610? 0.022 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans 
1.044 
(188.251) 5.849* 9.255** 
Agriculture Loans 0.411 (2129.73) 2.314 0.171 
Loans to Individuals to 
Purchase Automobiles 
12.201** 
(67.45) 9.090* 12.828** 
Other Loans to 
Individuals 
0.121 
(103.41) 2.935* 2.406 
^ A 7 denotes significance at the 0,1 level, an * denotes significance 
at the 0.05 level and a ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. îfean 
square error is given in parenthesis under the b^ F ratio. Tests of sig­
nificance areas calculated with 1 and 54 degrees of freedom for the F ratlcs. 
^A is the monetary tightness factor, b^ denotes metropolitan areas, 
h2 urban areas and b^ rural areas. 
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TABLE 4 
MEANS^ 
Variables 
Easy 
Metro. 
Areas 
Tight 
Metro. 
Areas 
Easy 
Urban 
Areas 
T ight 
Urban 
Areas 
Easy 
Rural 
Areas 
Tight 
Rural 
Areas 
U.S. Treasury 
Securit les 18.7 3.4 17.3 2.5 9.3 4.5 
Other U.S. Government 
Agency Securities 17.2 80.0 89.1 32.3 25.3 13.6 
Obligations of 
States, etc. 25.9 10.3 39.3 11.5 16.8 6.7 
Other Securities 20.8 18.8 76.6 14.5 10.6 44.4 
Residential Real 
Estate Loans -1.0 2.7 24.4 2.8 11.3 3.16 
Other Real Estate 
Loans 9.0 22.8 24.1 -0.6 8.0 6.07 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans 4.92 -1.35 23.8 9.0 22.4 3.8 
Agricultural Loans 53.8 95.7 2.8 -6.5 14.7 6.1 
Loans to Individuals 
to Purchase 
Automobiles 1.4 -11.4 8.4 -2.6 11.8 -1.2 
Other Loans to 
Individuals 2.0 0.4 13.4 -623.8 16.6 9.6 
^he means are given as the average percentage change from 1969 to 
1970. 
